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bstract
Rail shipments of hazardous materials expose the population near the routes to the possibility of an accident resulting in a spill. Rail routes are
etermined by economic concerns such as route length and the revenue generated for the originating carrier. In this paper we consider an alternate
outing strategy that takes accident risks into account. We employ a model to quantify rail transport risk and then use a weighted combination of
ost and risk and generate alternate routes. In some cases the alternate routes achieve significantly lower risk values than the practical routes at a
mall incremental cost. While there are generally fewer rerouting alternatives for rail than for road transport, considering the possible consequences
f a train derailment we argue that risk should be taken into account when selecting rail routes and that the cost–risk tradeoffs should be evaluated.
2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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. Introduction
Hazardous materials (“hazmats”) are essential to the soci-
tal choices made in industrialized countries. They are used
or heating, cooling, farming, medicine, manufacturing, mining,
nd other industrial processes. Hazmats are often transported
n large volumes over long distances. The U.S. Department of
ransportation (1998) estimates that over one million hazmat
ovements occur every day in the USA alone, with a total annual
olume estimated to be between 3 and 4 billion tonnes. Most of
his volume is moved by truck, with rail shipments accounting
or only 10% of the tonnage moved. However, since most rail
hipments are bulk shipments, in case of a release incident the
esulting consequences can be very high. According to the U.S.
epartment of Transportation (2004), in 2002 and 2003 a total
f 1685 rail hazmat incidents were reported, with 124 of them
lassified as serious. Four derailments in this period resulted in
vacuations of over a thousand people in each case. Each of
hese derailments resulted in damages exceeding $1M and the
otal damage due to rail incidents during 2002 and 2003 was
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oi:10.1016/j.aap.2007.01.006lose to $10M. Fortunately, there was only one fatality due to a
ail hazmat incident in this period.
While the number of deaths and injuries due to all traf-
c accidents dwarfs the number of deaths and injuries due to
azmat-related accidents, public concern about the risk of haz-
at incidents is rather intense. This is primarily due to the
nvoluntary nature of the risk and the potential for significant
onsequences in case of a rail hazmat incident. For these rea-
ons, the rail transport of hazmat receives considerable public
ttention.
Reductions in hazmat transport risks can be achieved in dif-
erent ways. Perhaps the most obvious way in which operations
esearch – along with risk assessment – can make a signifi-
ant contribution is in analyzing the routing of shipments. Until
ecently, considerably more attention has been given to the issue
f rerouting hazardous materials shipments on highways than to
he parallel issue of rerouting hazardous materials shipments by
ail. Numerous researchers have studied risk-related hazardous
aterials routing from a theoretical perspective, including Batta
nd Chiu (1988), Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani (1998), Erkut
nd Ingolfsson (2000), and Leonelli et al. (2000). From an
pplied perspective, highway rerouting has also been studied
xtensively (Harwood et al., 1993; Glickman and Sontag, 1995;
assini, 1998), whereas rail rerouting has received less atten-
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ion and been studied primarily as an applied research problem
Glickman, 1983; McNeil, 1991; Moore et al., 1995) or as a pol-
cy issue (Glickman, 1990; U.S. Department of Energy, 1998).
ompared to these previous studies, the research documented
ere addresses the cost–benefit tradeoffs of rail rerouting in an
pplied way, based on a model that is actually used by indus-
ry analysts, and recognizing the need to be situation-specific
nstead of generalizing as to whether rail rerouting is appropriate
r inappropriate in every case.
Some might argue that this is not surprising, given that the rail
ode generally offers fewer practical alternatives to the routes
lready being used. Moreover, they might contend that truckload
hipments are more conducive to rerouting, given that they are
enerally independent of one another, while carload shipments
eaded to various different destinations become highly interde-
endent once they are placed on the same train. McClure et al.
1988) observed that rail rerouting is different from highway
erouting of hazardous materials for the following reasons:
The railroad networks are not as dense as highway networks.
The total length of U.S. highways is about 15 times greater
than the length of the U.S. railroads. This presents a narrower
range of routing alternatives for hazardous materials.
Railroads do not have lines circumventing major population
centers comparable to interstate beltways around metropoli-
tan areas.
A given shipment is likely to be handled by more than one rail-
road carrier, whereas truck shipments are likely to be limited
to a single company. Interchange among railroad companies
can introduce inefficiencies in the global route selection pro-
cess since carriers are motivated to maximize their portion of
the movement.
To this list we add these additional reasons:
Redirecting selected rail shipments might disrupt train sched-
ules.
If costs increase, some rail traffic might be diverted to the
highway mode.
In recent times, however, these concerns may be less com-
elling because of two significant developments that have led to
new sense of urgency regarding the issue of rail rerouting. One
s the threat of domestic terrorist attacks involving tank cars in
opulated areas and the other is the prospect of numerous spent
uclear fuel shipments on rail cars once the high-level radioac-
ive waste repository opens in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Due to
hese concerns, both of which could tip the balance in favor of
erouting certain highly vulnerable or extremely hazardous rail
hipments, we need to better understand the associated costs and
enefits of rail rerouting as a risk reduction strategy.
The results we present in this paper are intended to shed
ight on this issue by providing objective estimates of the cost-
elated and risk-related impacts of diverting trains carrying tank
ars of hazardous materials from existing routes to alternative
outes that are ostensibly safer (note: spent nuclear fuel will
e shipped in specially designed containers that should be less
s
i
o
cd Prevention 39 (2007) 1015–1025
rone to release, in which case the risk estimates provided here
ould be conservatively high). These impact estimates are pro-
uced for a random sample of origin–destination pairs on the
.S. rail system using a network computer model in tandem
ith a mathematical risk model. For each pair in the sample, we
rst approximate the “existing route” using the network model’s
uilt-in route determination features and then we generate a
ange of alternative “reduced-risk routes” by incorporating a
isk metric into the network model’s routing calculations and
rogressively increasing its influence on route determination by
ncreasing its weight over a range of values.
In reality, the probability of a train accident will generally not
epend on whether there are hazmats aboard, although the con-
itional probability of a release could depend on the number of
azmat cars on the train and the nature of those cars (e.g., with
ank cars, some designs are more puncture-resistant than oth-
rs). Moreover, the severity of the release consequences could
epend on the commodity involved, with “toxic inhalation haz-
rd” chemicals generally considered to be among the worst. The
isk metric introduced below estimates the size of the expected
opulation that resides within a given radius of the location of a
rain accident involving a release of hazardous materials, based
n average values for the total number of cars in the train, the
otal number of hazmat cars among those cars, and the con-
itional probability of release from a hazmat car. Thus it is not
ommodity dependent. The routing model can be (and has been)
sed to examine the risks of different commodities. Commodity
ype can affect the conditional release probability and the impact
adius, but for this study we controlled for that by basing every
isk on the same representative, generic commodity.
. Cost and risk impacts
The main objective of this analysis is to evaluate the tradeoff
etween cost and risk when comparing an existing route to a
educed-risk route. As a surrogate for transportation cost we use
oute length, and we measure risk by estimating the expected
opulation that resides within a given radius of the location of
train accident involving a release of hazardous materials. Our
urpose is not to produce the most refined estimates possible, but
o provide a reasonable level of insight into the cost–risk trade-
ffs involved in rerouting rail shipments of hazardous materials
nd the advisability of related policy options.
Longer routes require more energy to move the freight and
ie up the cars and the freight for longer periods. Since hazmat
ail cars usually make up only a fraction of the train, rerout-
ng on longer routes will also affect the arrival time of all the
ther commodities on the train. Even so, route length alone
oes not capture all the cost factors associated with rerouting a
rain. For example, additional costs are incurred if more transfers
etween carriers become necessary, and car utilization suffers
hen alternative routes have lower speed limits.
Similarly, our risk metric does not account for every pos-ible risk factor, but it captures a number of important factors
nvolved in estimating the likelihood and adverse consequences
f hazmat-related train accidents. Table 1 shows the cause
ategories of hazardous material incidents for 2003 for var-
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Table 1
Hazardous material incidents for 2003—cause by mode
Mode Incidents with evacuations Cause
Human error Package failure Accident/derailment Other
Railway 21 5 3 13 0
Air 82 74 8 0 0
Highway 110 76 15 18 1
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ous transportation modes, compiled by the U.S. Department
f Transportation (2004). Only the accident/incident causes are
xplicitly taken into account in our risk model. We address them
y assuming that accident/incident rates are correlated with traf-
c volume and associating different train accident rates with the
ifferent annual traffic volumes from link to link. Otherwise we
ssume that the causes (human error, package failure, and other)
re reflected in the accident rates but are independent of the
etwork link and apply evenly across the network.
Commodity type is another important determinant of risk.
hile not a factor of interest in this macroscopic study, com-
odity type would have to be addressed when considering the
etails of a specific situation involving a particular O–D pair.
he study by Brown et al. (2000) shows that most of the toxic-
y-inhalation (TIH) fatalities occurs in rail transportation, while
ost of the fatalities for flammable materials and explosives
ccur in highway incidents. Within the TIH category, the break-
own of casualties by specific chemical is given in Table 2.
In any policy analysis, the fact that circumstances will differ
rom situation to situation means that a proposed policy may
rove to be very attractive in one set of circumstances but not in
nother. With rail rerouting in particular, in some circumstances
t might be highly advantageous because alternative routes exist
hich are much safer without being more expensive, while in
thers, it might be out of the question because there is no alter-
ative route that is safer at any cost. Other situations will involve
ess clear-cut distinctions and an acceptable tradeoff might then
e one in which a shipper or carrier agrees to change the route
nd incur a modest increase in shipping cost in exchange for
ess risk, realizing the effect that a major release accident can
ave not only on public safety but also on profitability, given the
elated costs of emergency response, clean-up, legal damages,
nsurance, bad publicity, and so on.
able 2
istribution of total TIH fatality and injury risk by chemical
hemical Percent of total
hlorine 58.5
mmonia 26.0
ther 10.0
ydrogen fluoride 3.6
ulfur dioxide 1.0
uming sulfuric acid 0.5
uming nitric acid 0.4
otal 100.0
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26 31 1
In terms of the cost and risk impacts that we employ (route
ength and population exposure), the best conceivable outcome is
hat an alternative route yields a substantially lower risk than the
xisting route while incurring no additional mileage or possible
ven reducing the mileage. In their study of the risk–cost trade-
ffs in rerouting highway shipments of hazardous materials,
lickman and Sontag (1995) found that in some instances a sig-
ificant reduction in risk was attainable for a modest increase in
ravel distance. This analysis reveals whether similar situations
lso exist in the rail mode.
. The network model
In actual practice, the routing of rail freight shipments is based
n a number of factors, including route mileage, track quality,
peed restrictions, track ownership, trackage rights, interchange
pportunities, yard locations, and revenue sharing. Train sched-
les and routes are developed in response to the geographical
istribution of demands for rail service, subject to constraints
mposed by limitations on equipment, personnel and operating
ractices, and by the limited capacities of tracks and yards. The
esult is a complex and dynamic pattern of activity in which
reight cars are switched from one train to another and handed
ff from one carrier to another as they move from their points
f origination toward their final destinations.
To simulate individual train movements in this system, ALK
ssociates of Princeton, N.J. developed a computer model of the
.S. rail network and a shortest-path type algorithm for gener-
ting the “practical route” between any given pair of origination
nd termination stations. The model contains about 200,000
iles of rail line and 60,000 freight stations. The model has
een used extensively within government and industry for ana-
ytical studies involving route determination under alternative
cenarios, dealing with a range of concerns including safety,
ariffs, and system restructuring. For practical route genera-
ion, the network relies on a proprietary database of segment
link) impedances, interchange (node) impedances, track cate-
ories, and associated decision rules. Developed heuristically,
hese features have been fine-tuned over time to produce rout-
ngs that correspond to actual operating experience. Confidence
n the model is demonstrated by its use in generating mileages
n the Carload Waybill Sample published annually by the U.S.
epartment of Transportation’s Surface Transportation Board.
The purpose of this model is not to capture every activ-
ty and nuance of railroad operations, including actual traffic
olumes, schedules, switches, crossings, track geometry, and
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errain. Rather it is to approximate the actual routing and dis-
ances involved when a shipment moves by train from its origin
o its destination – with or without pre-specifying the originating
nd terminating railroads or the interchange points – and to esti-
ate the associated risk in terms of the census-based population
hat would be exposed to a release anywhere along the generated
oute. As discussed below, the model is capable of generating
outes based solely on ordinary operating parameters such as
istance and track quality (“practical routing”), which it does
sing heuristic methods to estimate link impedances, or based on
combination of these operating parameters and safety-related
arameters such as train accident rates that depend on track qual-
ty and population density according to census data (“reduced
isk routing”).
. Practical and alternate routes
We estimated existing routes for the selected O–D pairs using
he practical route features of the network model (as opposed to
hortest routes). The length of the practical route is usually very
lose to the length of the shortest route, but is not always the
ame.
The estimation of alternate routes with reduced risk required
dditional link data on train accident history and residential pop-
lation density. Based on these link attributes and others, we
alculatedRj, the value of the risk metric for each link j, and com-
ined it with Pj, the corresponding practical-route impedance
alue for link j, to obtain Cj, the mixed impedance value for
ach link. Denoting by λ the weight attached to the risk met-
ic, we calculated the mixed impedance as Cj = λRj + (1 − λ)Pj,
sing λ = 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, and 1.0. If the alternate routes had
een determined using Rj as the impedance (which corresponds
o using λ = 1 in this weighted sum), the results would in many
ases have diverged from the corresponding existing routes to
n unrealistic extent.
To generate alternate routes with reduced risk, we use a
eighted combination of cost and risk and conduct a paramet-
ic analysis over the weights. There are many other conceivable
ethods. For example, one could minimize the maximum risk
y successively removing high-risk links from the network prior
o routing (see Erkut and Glickman, 1997) or minimize the vari-
nce of the consequences (see Erkut and Ingolfsson, 2000). The
oal here is not to advocate one approach over the others, but to
emonstrate that in certain circumstances rerouting is a worthy
ption for rail transport of hazmats.
The mathematical model used to calculate the Rj values is a
implified version of the model originally developed by Raj and
lickman (1985) to assess tank car risks on railroad routes. We
rovide this model in the next section.
. Network link risk assessment methodologyA total of seven link-related risk factors were used to assess
he risk along each link j of the network, as described below:
. Link length (dj) in miles.
e
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. Link-related accident rate (rj) in train accidents per loaded
car-mile.
We calculated this as the average of two accident rates:
(a) link-specific rate Lj and (b) national rate Nk. Lj is the
total number of train accidents on link j over a 3-year period
divided by the volume of loaded freight car-miles on link j in
the same period, or Aj/Vj. Nk is the national accident rate in
the traffic volume category k to which link j belongs, based
on the value of Vj. If J(k) is used to denote the set of links j
with traffic volume in category k, then we have
Nk =
∑
j ∈ J(k)Aj∑
j ∈ J(k)Vj
. Total number of loaded cars per train (Y), assumed to be 50.
. Number of tank cars per train loaded with the hazardous
material of concern (X), assumed to be 10.
. Conditional release probability, the percentage of tank cars
damaged or derailed in train accidents that experience a major
release (p), assumed to be 25%.
. The size of the critical impact area associated with a major
release of the hazardous material of concern (a), assumed to
be a circle with radius one mile.
. The residential population density in the critical impact area
(ρj).
We estimated the ρj values by overlaying the network on a
ensus area map in a GIS and calculated the population density
ithin a band centered on each link, based on the census counts
or the areas involved. This procedure employs two layers of
ata, one containing the outlines of the nation’s census tracts
nd linked to a database of associated population counts, and
nother containing the network links, around which boundaries
re laid out on either side at varying distances, corresponding to
ifferent possible impact radii. Then, for each rectangle centered
n each link, the patchwork of census tracts either completely
r partially with the rectangle is identified and the associated
opulation values are summed up, where the proportion of a
ensus tract’s population that enters into the calculation is based
n the percentage of its area that falls within the rectangle.
For the most part, experience shows that the actual impacts
f hazmat release accidents (fires, explosions, or toxic vapor
louds) affect only small areas in the vicinity of the track, so that
his approach provides an adequate approximation. In fact, the
tudy on evacuation times and radii by Mills et al. (1995) shows
hat the average radius of the evacuation area is 1.2 km with a
tandard deviation of 1.4 km. Given that evacuation radii are set
ased on conservative estimates, the actual impact area of an
verage incident is likely to be even smaller than 1 km. In some
nstances, however, there may be other outcomes, such as an
longated, windswept vapor cloud that extends over a long dis-
ance, or the extensive environmental impact of a large volume
f toxic substance spilling into a body of water. Such scenarios
ould warrant more detailed GIS analysis, but are outside the
cope of this study and tangential to its objectives.
sis and Prevention 39 (2007) 1015–1025 1019
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Table 3
Values of the risk factors
Risk factor Value
Link length Varies by link
Train accident rate Varies by link
Loaded cars per train 50
Tank cars of concern per train 5
Conditional release probability 25%
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In an improved model, the use of the GIS could also be
xpanded further to find alternative routes that circumvent
pecific facilities that are most vulnerable to the impacts of acci-
ents, such as hospitals and schools. Similar work was done by
anwhar et al. (2000), who used GIS to find alternative routes
or hazardous waste shipments through urban areas that avoided
oth the general population and specific vulnerable facilities.
We calculated the risk on each link j using a simplified version
f the model of Raj and Glickman (1985). However, instead of
xpressing the risk in the form of a risk profile (i.e., a frequency
ersus consequence curve) we use the following formula for the
xpected risk per train on a route:
=
∑
j
fjNj
ere fj is the expected percentage of trains on link j that expe-
ience an accident involving a major release of the hazardous
aterial of concern and Nj is the expected consequence of such
n accident, as measured by the expected number of residents
n the critical area of exposure. The products fj Nj are summed
ver the links of the route in question.
Both fj and Nj depend on XR, the number of tank cars of
oncern that experience a major release are damaged or derailed
hen a train accident occurs, which is reflected in the following
ormulas for fj and Nj:
j = rjdjYP(XR > 0) and Nj = ρjaE(XR) (1)
hese two formulas require knowledge of the probability dis-
ribution P(XR). Observing that this probability depends on XD,
he number of loaded tank cars of concern that are damaged or
erailed, we can write the following:
(XR) =
∑
XD
P(XD, XR) =
∑
XD
P(XD)P(XR|XD) (2)
here P(XD,XR) is the joint probability that XD tank cars are
amaged or derailed and XR of those tank cars experience a
elease.
For P(XD), we assume that the probability distribution is
ypergeometric, based on the view that the occurrence of tank
ar damage or derailment as a case of randomly sampling XD
ars out of Y cars without replacement. The number of samples
s X. Hence we have
(XD) = [X!/[XD!XN !]][(Y−X)!/[(YD−XD)!(YN − XN )!]]
Y !/[YD!YN !]
(3)
n (3) XN is the number of tank cars not damaged or derailed
mong the X tank cars of concern (=X−XD), YD the number of
oaded cars damaged or derailed, and YN is the number of loaded
ars not damaged or derailed (=Y−YD).For P(XR|XD), we assume that the probability distribution
s binomial, based on viewing the occurrence of multiple tank
ar releases as a Bernoulli process involving XD damaged or
erailed tank cars, each of which has the same probability of
t
t
t
sritical impact radius 1 mile
esidential population density Varies by link
elease p. In this case we have
(XR|XD) = XD!
XR!(XD − XR)!p
XR (1 − p)(XD−XR) (4)
Combining equations (1) and (2) with (3) and (4), we obtain
he final expressions for fj and Nj, the factors used to calculate
j = fj Nj, the risk estimate for link j: 0
j = rjdjY [1 − P(XR = 0)]
= rjdjY
⎡
⎣1 −
∑
XD
P(XD)P(XR = 0|XD)
⎤
⎦
= rjdjY
⎡
⎣1 −
∑
XD
P(XD)(1 − p)XD
⎤
⎦
nd
j = ρja
∑
XR
XRP(XR) = ρja
∑
XR
XR
∑
XD
P(XD)P(XR|XD)
he risk estimate for each link estimates the expected number of
esidents exposed to the critical impacts of a hazardous material
elease arising from a train accident, when one or more tank
ars contributes to the total amount released. Table 3 shows the
isk factors accounted for in the model and the values of the
nes that remain constant from one link to another. While these
umbers are fairly typical of the values encountered in practice,
he specific numbers do not matter as much as the fact that we
sed the same ones to generate every alternative route.
To summarize, in order to calculate risk as the expected num-
er of people who live in the area that would be affected if the
ontents of a tank car full of the hazardous material in ques-
ion were to be released in a train accident, for each link we
ultiplied together the accident rate, link length, conditional
elease probability, impact area, and population density on each
egment of the route in question and then summed these prod-
cts. The accident rate is assumed to depend on traffic volume
nd the conditional release probability is assumed to depend
n the train length and the number of tank cars loaded with
he hazardous material of concern. The impact area is assumed
o depend on how hazardous the material is and the residen-
ial population density within that area is based on census
tatistics.
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Table 4
Route lengths for the sample city pairs (miles)
Route Weight (λ) attached to risk
Origin Destination 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Jackson (MS) Wichita (KS) 795 804 815 815 815 1223
Denver (CO) Cheyenne (WY) 116 116 116 116 748 748
Wichita (KS) Charleston (WV) 1058 1060 1060 1060 1060 1697
Newark (NJ) Wichita (KS) 1639 1641 1626 1626 1636 1853
Baltimore (MD) Charleston (WV) 442 442 617 617 805 842
New York (NY) Charlotte (NC) 994 1243 1243 1243 1243 1280
Fargo (ND) Birmingham (AL) 1426 1426 1610 1610 2470 3487
Milwaukee (WI) Boston (MA) 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113 1297
Wichita (KS) Providence (RI) 1705 1709 1699 1694 1694 1878
Newark (NJ) Milwaukee (WI) 1054 1054 1056 1056 1056 1281
Newark (NJ) Denver (CO) 1980 1982 1982 1982 1991 2284
Des Moines (IA) Jacksonville (FL) 1360 1441 1441 1441 1441 1451
Charleston (WV) Portland (ME) 1085 1085 1171 1171 1171 1208
Virginia Beach (VA) Chicago (IL) 1065 1072 1072 1072 1072 1063
Jacksonville (FL) Charlotte (NC) 513 513 513 513 513 513
Virginia Beach (VA) Minneapolis (MN) 1487 1494 1494 1494 1497 1699
Columbus (OH) Omaha (NE) 864 864 864 864 866 956
Omaha (NE) St. Louis (MO) 576 576 576 576 576 576
Augusta (GA) Detroit (MI) 976 976 1240 1240 1240 1423
Indianapolis (IN) Milwaukee (WI) 344 344 344 344 344 645
Little Rock (AR) Boston (MA) 1537 1601 1624 1624 1624 1815
Baltimore (MD) Billings (MT) 2151 2151 2151 2151 2214 2358
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averages on a graph, which shows that route length grows while
risk declines as more and more weight is attached to the risk
impact. Given the observed rates of change, we can say thatacksonville (FL) St. Louis (MO) 1016
irmingham (AL) Providence (RI) 1484
. Computational results
.1. Route length and risk
For this analysis, we identified a sample of origin–destination
O–D) pairs by first selecting one major city from each state
n the continental U.S. and then randomly generating 24 city
airs from among them. Then we used our models to deter-
ine for each O–D pair the existing route, resulting in the
oute lengths shown in Table 4 (0% column) and the risk
stimates shown in Table 5 (0% column). The route lengths
ange from a minimum of 116 mi (Denver–Cheyenne) to a
aximum of 2151 mi (Baltimore–Billings), while the risk
alues on the existing routes range from a minimum of 1
erson impacted per thousand (Denver–Cheyenne) to a maxi-
um of 350 persons impacted per thousand (Virginia Beach–
inneapolis).
Next we generated the alternative routes using a weighted
ombination of the practical-route and reduced-risk impedances.
y giving progressively more weight to the latter, i.e., by increas-
ng λ from 0 to 100% in increments of 20%, we generated 24
ets of routes.
.2. Relative changes in route length and risk
Based on the results in Table 4, Table 6 shows for each O–D
air the relative change in route length as the weight increases.
ach value shown is the ratio of the corresponding route length
hown in Table 4 to the length of the existing route shown in
he 0% column of Table 4. Table 7 shows for each O–D pair
F
r6 1016 1016 1016 1016
9 1519 1519 1519 1744
he relative change in risk as the weight increases, calculated
imilarly using the results in Table 5. The average value of the
4 changes associated with each different value of λ is shown
t the bottom of Tables 6 and 7. Fig. 1 plots these two sets ofig. 1. Change in route length and risk as a function of the weight attached to
isk.
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Table 5
Route risks for the sample city pairs (population affected)
Route Weight (λ) attached to risk
Origin Destination 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Jackson (MS) Wichita (KS) 0.018 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004
Denver (CO) Cheyenne (WY) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Wichita (KS) Charleston (WV) 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.008
Newark (NJ) Wichita (KS) 0.019 0.019 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011
Baltimore (MD) Charleston (WV) 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011
New York (NY) Charlotte (NC) 0.200 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016
Fargo (ND) Birmingham (AL) 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005
Milwaukee (WI) Boston (MA) 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
Wichita (KS) Providence (RI) 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.015
Newark (NJ) Milwaukee (WI) 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
Newark (NJ) Denver (CO) 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013
Des Moines (IA) Jacksonville (FL) 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Charleston (WV) Portland (ME) 0.024 0.024 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
Virginia Beach (VA) Chicago (IL) 0.340 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330
Jacksonville (FL) Charlotte (NC) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Virginia Beach (VA) Minneapolis (MN) 0.350 0.340 0.340 0.340 0.340 0.330
Columbus (OH) Omaha (NE) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006
Omaha (NE) St. Louis (MO) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Augusta (GA) Detroit (MI) 0.087 0.087 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023
Indianapolis (IN) Milwaukee (WI) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010
Little Rock (AR) Boston (MA) 0.022 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Baltimore (MD) Billings (MT) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.010
Jacksonville (FL) St. Louis (MO) 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Birmingham (AL) Providence (RI) 0.200 0.027 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.014
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Aable 6
atio of reduced-risk route length to existing route length
oute Weight (λ) attache
rigin Destination 0%
ackson (MS) Wichita (KS) 1.00
enver (CO) Cheyenne (WY) 1.00
ichita (KS) Charleston (WV) 1.00
ewark (NJ) Wichita (KS) 1.00
altimore (MD) Charleston (WV) 1.00
ew York (NY) Charlotte (NC) 1.00
argo (ND) Birmingham (AL) 1.00
ilwaukee (WI) Boston (MA) 1.00
ichita (KS) Providence (RI) 1.00
ewark (NJ) Milwaukee (WI) 1.00
ewark (NJ) Denver (CO) 1.00
es Moines (IA) Jacksonville (FL) 1.00
harleston (WV) Portland (ME) 1.00
irginia Beach (VA) Chicago (IL) 1.00
acksonville (FL) Charlotte (NC) 1.00
irginia Beach (VA) Minneapolis (MN) 1.00
olumbus (OH) Omaha (NE) 1.00
maha (NE) St. Louis (MO) 1.00
ugusta (GA) Detroit (MI) 1.00
ndianapolis (IN) Milwaukee (WI) 1.00
ittle Rock (AR) Boston (MA) 1.00
altimore (MD) Billings (MT) 1.00
acksonville (FL) St. Louis (MO) 1.00
irmingham (AL) Providence (RI) 1.00
5pt]
verage 1.00d to risk
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
1.01 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.54
1.00 1.00 1.00 6.45 6.45
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.60
1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.13
1.00 1.40 1.40 1.82 1.91
1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.29
1.00 1.13 1.13 1.73 2.45
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.16
1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.10
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.22
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.15
1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.07
1.00 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.11
1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.14
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.11
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.46
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.87
1.04 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.18
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.10
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.96 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.18
1.01 1.05 1.05 1.33 1.51
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Table 7
Ratio of reduced-risk route risk to existing route risk
Route Weight (λ) attached to risk
Origin Destination 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Jackson (MS) Wichita (KS) 1.00 0.49 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.21
Denver (CO) Cheyenne (WY) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.63
Wichita (KS) Charleston (WV) 1.00 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.54
Newark (NJ) Wichita (KS) 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.58
Baltimore (MD) Charleston (WV) 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.55
New York (NY) Charlotte (NC) 1.00 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
Fargo (ND) Birmingham (AL) 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.72 0.59 0.58
Milwaukee (WI) Boston (MA) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wichita (KS) Providence (RI) 1.00 0.92 0.79 0.67 0.67 0.63
Newark (NJ) Milwaukee (WI) 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Newark (NJ) Denver (CO) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93
Des Moines (IA) Jacksonville (FL) 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Charleston (WV) Portland (ME) 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Virginia Beach (VA) Chicago (IL) 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Jacksonville (FL) Charlotte (NC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Virginia Beach (VA) Minneapolis (MN) 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94
Columbus (OH) Omaha (NE) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.78
Omaha (NE) St. Louis (MO) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Augusta (GA) Detroit (MI) 1.00 1.00 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26
Indianapolis (IN) Milwaukee (WI) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91
Little Rock (AR) Boston (MA) 1.00 0.77 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
Baltimore (MD) Billings (MT) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.83
Jacksonville (FL) St. Louis (MO) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Birmingham (AL) Providence (RI) 1.00 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07
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verage 1.00
s more emphasis is placed on risk reduction, an increasingly
reater change in route length is needed to achieve roughly the
ame reduction in risk. This demonstrates diminishing returns
n the safety benefits associated with increasingly circuitous
outes.
Returning to Table 7, we find that the New York-Charlotte
oute shows the most dramatic risk reduction when risk is first
actored into the routing impedance with a weight of 20%. The
atio declined from 1.00 to 0.09, representing a 91% drop in
isk, achieved by reducing population exposure at the expense
f an increase in route length ratio of 1.00–1.25 (see Table 6),
r 25% more miles (about 250 additional miles in absolute
erms).
The Birmingham–Providence route shows the next highest
isk reduction. When the risk impedance was given a weight
f 20% for this O–D pair, the risk fell by 86%. Somewhat sur-
risingly, the route length was also reduced by 4%, resulting in
route that dominates the existing route on both counts, i.e.,
horter distance and lower risk. Fig. 2 shows the existing (prac-
ical) route and this reduced-risk (weighted) route. Fig. 3 shows
he route resulting from using a 40% weight instead of 20%.
his route is only slightly longer than the existing route but its
isk has been reduced to less than one-tenth of the risk of the
xisting route.Another route of interest is the Jackson–Wichita route, where
20% weight on risk resulted in a risk reduction of 50% but
equired only a 1% increase in route length. Based on the cost
nd risk factors captured by the network and risk models we
w
i
w
r1.00 0.88 0.78 0.77 0.74
sed, these results suggest that rerouting might be advantageous
n certain situations.
.3. Alternative approach—constrained risk reduction
For each O–D pair in the sample, the results above show how
oute length changed as more and more emphasis was put on
inimizing risk, which means less and less emphasis was put on
inimizing route length. An alternative approach is to constrain
he extent to which the route length can be increased and then
ncrease the weight given to the risk criterion until the constraint
ecomes binding. (Ideally, we would solve constrained shortest
ath problems, but this cannot be done with the routing software
e used.) We applied this approach to each of the 24 city pairs,
rst with a cap of 10% and then with a 20% cap.
With a 10% cap, we found that the risk decreased by 15%
n average in exchange for an average increase in route length
f 2%. The 2% value was below the 10% cap because it was
ot always possible to take full advantage of the cap in order to
chieve a further reduction in risk. For ten of the routes there
as no change.
With a 20% cap, we found that the risk decreased by 20% on
verage in exchange for a 4% average increase in route length. In
oth cases, the Birmingham–Providence route changed the most,
ith a decrease in risk of 93% gained at the expense of an 8%
ncrease in route length. The next largest change was associated
ith the Jackson–Wichita route, for which a 76% decrease in
isk was attained in exchange for an 8% increase in route length.
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tes: e
O
r
a
rFig. 2. Birmingham–Providence routher notable results were obtained for the Wichita–Providence
oute, Wichita–Newark route, the Charleston–Providence route,
nd the Little Rock–Boston route. These four routes showed risk
eductions of 32–36% with accompanying increases in route
l
c
c
l
Fig. 3. Birmingham–Providence routes: existing and reduced risk (λ = 20%).ength of 0–8%. These cases provide further evidence that in
ertain situations, it might be possible to achieve a signifi-
ant risk reduction in exchange for a small increase in route
ength.
xisting and reduced risk (λ = 40%).
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Table 8
Related statistics for the Newark–Wichita route
Existing route Reduced-risk
route
Number of carriers 2 2
Initiating carrier’s share 0.4 0.3
Population exposure (millions) 2.3 1.1
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Table 9
Related statistics for the Little Rock–Boston route
Existing Reduced-
risk
Difference
(%)
Route length (miles) 1537 1624 6
Route risk (per
thousand)
22 15 32
Number of carriers 2 2
Initiating carrier’s share 0.7 0.8 1
Population exposure
(millions)
2.0 1.7 −16
Accident frequency (per
thousand trains)
6.2 4.8 −23
Average individual risk 11.0 8.8 −20
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ations in routing patterns. It is our hope that the computationalccident frequency (per thousand trains) 4.0 7.3
verage individual risk (per billion) 8.3 10.0
.4. Related route statistics
In addition to the estimated route lengths and risk estimates
enerated for the sample O–D pairs, we also recorded a number
f other statistics that would bear upon an assessment of the
osts and benefits associated with alternative routes. They are as
ollows:
The number of different carriers involved,
The initiating carrier’s share of the total length of haul,
The total population exposure with a specified distance from
the track,
The expected accident frequency, and
The average individual risk, as expressed by the ratio of the
risk value to the total population exposure.
The last item estimates the probability that a person who
ives close to the route will in fact be in the impact area of
hazardous material release resulting from a train accident.
able 8 illustrates for the Newark–Wichita route how the val-
es of these statistics change from one end of the spectrum (the
xisting route) to the other (the 100% reduced-risk route). Also
hown are the changes in the route length and risk from Table 4.
hese are, respectively, 1639–1853 miles (a 13% increase), and
.019–0.011 (a 42% decline).
These results show first of all that the same two carriers
re involved in the overall shipment. The initiating carrier’s
hare of the haul drops by about 25% on the alternative
oute, which amounts to a difference in revenue miles of
.4(1639) − 0.3(1853) ∼= 100. Population exposure drops by
ore than 50%, which is the major reason for the decrease
n risk. Accident frequency increases by more than 80%, but
his difference is not high enough to keep the risk from declin-
ng, i.e., it is outweighed by the favorable changes in the other
isk factors. Average individual risk does increase, however, by
0%, indicating that any person living near the track is more
ikely to be impacted by a tank car incident. But given that
his is a change from 8 to 10 per billion, the risk remains
xtremely small. The increase in route length, the decline
n the initiating carrier’s share, and the rise in accident fre-
uency could all be unacceptable, despite the 42% reduction
n risk.Although the reduced-risk route in the Newark–Wichita
xample is associated with a higher accident frequency and
igher average individual risk than the existing route, there are
ther cases in which the reduced-risk route is slightly longer than
e
c
r
s(per billion)
he existing route but superior to it for all risk-related criteria. For
xample, consider the Little Rock–Boston route when the weight
ssigned to risk minimization criterion is 40%. Table 9 shows
he route statistics for the existing route and this reduced-risk
oute.
The two routes look quite similar on a map, despite the 32%
eduction in risk, which is attributable to this single difference:
he practical route goes through part of the Cleveland area, while
he weighted route takes a large detour around it and avoids it
ompletely.
. Conclusions
The results presented here illustrate that the issue of rail
erouting ought to receive closer attention, because they indi-
ate that situations exist in which risk can be reduced without
engthening the route substantially. By combining transporta-
ion network modeling with risk assessment and examining a
ample of intercity routes, we were able to identify potential
pportunities for improving safety at a reasonable cost. Admit-
edly, the changes in route length and risk discussed here do
ot represent the entire nation or even those traffic corridors
ith the highest volumes of tank car movements of hazardous
aterials. Furthermore, the cost and risk measures employed do
ot constitute an intensive study of all the important economic
actors, operating impacts, or safety considerations. An accu-
ate and detailed accounting of the cost factors would need to
ddress such impacts as the size of train consists, the length
f haul, the scheduling of trains, the associated locomotive
equirements, and the volume and location of traffic interchanges
etween railroads. Such detail is clearly outside the scope of this
tudy, requiring a more microscopic representation of train oper-
tions. Yet, from a more macroscopic perspective, the results
resented here show that instances exist in which significant
isk reductions could be achieved with relatively minor alter-vidence offered in this paper will inform the debate over the
ost-effectiveness of rerouting rail shipments of hazardous mate-
ials, and that this will result in more detailed studies for specific
hipments.
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